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Introduction 
The business enterprise is central to the operation of the Canad ian capitalist 
economy in that it is a vehicle for the accumulation of profit, as well as a signif· 
icant social location of employment. It is therefore one of the key mechanisms 
through which inter-class relations are mediated. A number of feminist schol- 
ars have pointed out that those class relations cannot be understood in isola- 
tion from gender relations. As Folbre and Hartmann (1988: 192) note 
disparagingly, 'the rhetoric of class interest simply subsumes the possibility of 
gender interests .' In their historical study of the English middle class between 
1780 and  1850, Davidoff and Hall (1987: 13)  begin  their analysis fron1 the 
proposition that 'gender and class always operate together'. The development, 
and claim to moral superiority, of the middle class in the period they studied 
'was articulated within a gendered concept of class. Middle-class gentlemen 
and middle-class ladies each had their appointed place in this newly mapped 
social world.' Indeed, they argue that gender played a strategic role in the 
development of the middle class in that 'A heavily gendered view of the world 
was utilized to soften, if not disavov,1, the disruption of a growing class system 
as the master and household head was transmuted into employer on the one 
hand and husband/fa ther  on the other: 
In the contemporary period, the intersection between gender and class has 
been examined by feminist scholars in the context of women as workers 
(Fudge, 1991), but less in the intra-class context of women within the owner- 
ship class. One significant aspect of an examination of the potentially gendered 
nature of business ownership \vould be the extent to which women's role in, 
and membersh ip of, that class is mediated by their position within the family 
(Zeitlin, 1989; Davidoff and Hall, 1987}. As Folbre and Hartmann (1988: 191} 
point out, in the context of working-class women, 'members of families are 
  
182. Law as  a Gender ing Pract ice 
 
assumed to have the same class membership and class interests as their male 
wage earner.' Yet women who do not have access to a wage themselves are 
dependent on a wage-earner, or are possibly more dependent on state benefits. 
Women who do work for a wage may still be expected to  assume greater 
responsibility for family well-being. This latter point may still hold true even if 
women are themselves property or business owners (Belcourt, 1991: 67). One 
important social location where the intersection of class, gender, and family 
relationships can be observed is the family business,1 in which women  may 
have the opportunity  not just to be workers in the enterprise but also to be 
owners or managers. Indeed, the family business is a location where analyti· 
cally distinct class positions, of owner on the one hand and worker on the 
other, become blurred. Further, investigation of the role of women in family 
businesses may provide insight into the manner in which two spheres of liber- 
alism's 'private' realm-the business enterprise and the family-intersect 
(Boyd, 1997; Davidoff and Hall, 1987) . 
If the question of whether and how women's participation in family 
businesses is 'gendered' has been neglected by feminist researchers, even less 
an object of attention has been the contemporary significance of legal rules in 
the constitution and maintenance of that gendered family business enterprise. 
This chapter seeks to make a contribution to that assessment. In accordance 
with the theme of this collection, law will be examined as a 'gendering strat- 
egy', that is, a process that produces gender identities and 'insists on a specific 
version of gender differentiation' (Smart, 1992: 34). An attempt will be made 
to assess the continuing importance of the rules of corporate law in maintain- 
ing gendered identities and opportunities for women in family businesses. 
Historically, of course, as Davidoff and Hall (1987: 275-89) demonstrate, law 
played a largely restrictive role in that women were limited in the forms of 
property they could legally hold and what they could do with that property. It 
is useful to ask whether corporate law now plays a more facilitative role for 
women. Does it constitute differences between the roles of women business 
owners and those of their male counterparts? Are t he 'subjects' of corporate 
law gendered? 
It should be emphasized that the examination of corporate  law from a 
feminist perspective is in its infancy. Such work as has been done has by and 
large focused on a prelimin ary demonstration that the fundamental premises of 
corporate law, though ostensibly gender-neutral, in fact are permeated with 
gendered understandings and discourses (Lahey and Salter, 1985; Bauman, 
19.91). This fe1ninist rereading of corporate law can usef ully be linked to a 
recent and broader feminist project of critiquing the premises of economics 
(Nelson, 1996; Folbre and Hartma nn, 1988; Ferber and Nelson, 1993; 
McCluskey, 1996), since the economic perspective on law is one of the 1nore 
enduring, and contested, intellectual perspectives on law in the North 
American context (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991; Cheffins, 1997; Trebilcock, 
1991; Williams, 1991). The first task of  this chapter, therefore,  is to outline 
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some of the key premises of corporate law, along with the critique from 
feminists about their gendered underpinnings. The purpose of doing this is to 
demonstrate how the doctrines of corporate law may operate at a symbolic 
level to constitute gendered understandings of the appropriate structure and 
operation of business enterprises. 
However.  this  chapter is in  part a  plea to  move to  the  second stage  of 
feminist engagement with corporate law. This is to specif y. using the admit- 
tedly limited sources of empirical information that currently exist, the actual 
influence of corporate Jaw in structuring gendered business practices and 
producing gendered material effects for wom en within firms, recognizing the 
variation in types of corporate enterprises. It will be argued that in the specific 
context of the family firm, there is a need to be sensitive to other constitutive 
practices that may be at work in this domain . Thus, care must b taken in 
attributing primacy to the speci fic role of corporate law in the gendering of 
family business enterprises. 
 
Corporate  Law, Economics, and  Gender 
Business enterprises can be operated through a variety of legal forms, such as 
sole proprietorships, partnerships, co-operatives, joint ventures, and corpora- 
tions.2 These different legal frameworks for doing business allocate the risks, 
responsibilities, and benefits of enterprise in a variety of ways. One implication 
of this is that these dif ferent legal forms may create different legal resources, 
opportttnities, and restrictions for the mediation of class or gender relations in 
the context of the business enterprise. One legally authored form of enterprise, 
the corporation, is popularly regarded as the most pervasive mechanism for 
doing business, despite the fact that in Canada.• as in other jurisdictions, many 
small enterprlses are not actually incorporated (Freedman, 1994) . Corporate 
law is best understood as a set of rules governing the structure and organiza- 
tion of a business entity and as a device for allocating responsibilities for action 
\vithin the organization. From the la'v and economics perspective, the purpose 
of corporate law is to allow a business or firm to function in the interests of 
efficiency. From this perspective, corporate Jaw provisions are a cheaper alter- 
native to an individual market-based negotiation of terms on which to invest, 
work, manage, supply raw materials or resources, and so on. As Easterbrook 
and Fischel (1991: 34) put it, 'corporate law fills in the blanks and oversights 
with the terms that people would have bargained for had they anticipated the 
problems and been able to transact costlessly in advance.' Thus, the major 
ways in which the legislated rules of corporate law are said to facilitate the 
operation of business enterprises are the following. 
Separate Legal Entity 
Section 15 of the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) provides the corpo- 
ration with a separate legal personality that is. autonomous from those who 
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own it (shareholders) and those who run it (directors). Corporate law thus 
creates a new category of legal 'person'. Its personhood enables the  corpora- 
tion to ·act', in legal terms, independently of those who own and/or run it. It 
can have legal relationships with ·outsiders ·to the corporation, such as credi- 
tors, suppl iers, customers, and clients, as well as With its own shareholders and 
directors. Its individual personhood allows it to make contracts, to sue and be 
sued, and to have rights. 
One strand of feminist theorizing would focus on how this emphasis on 
carving out spaces and categories of separation and autonomy, which is played 
out in liberal philosophy and scientific discourse as much as it is in corporate 
law, is associated with masculinity and valued on that basis, while femininity 
is associated with the connectedness and altruism that allows the (male) 
autonomy to exist (England, 1993: 40). More specifically, Hall (1995: 173) 
argues that the separate legal entity doctrine 'operates to split both the involve- 
ment and responsibility of directors from the acts and relations of a corpora- 
tion. It starts  with the assumption that directors . . . are not primarily 
responsible for the acts they undertake on behalf of or as a corporation.' This 
feminist theme that the norms of corporate law operate to d isplace responsi- 
bility for the consequences of action from where it 'rightly ' belongs, in this 
case with the directors, is one that will recur when we look at the other funda- 
mental contribution of corporate law to the organization of a corporation, that 
of limited liability for shareholders. 
 
Specialization and Hierarchy 
Corporate statutes establish specific roles to be played by actors within the 
corporation. These legally established roles are then allocated different rights 
and responsibilities. The most significant roles are those of shareholder, direc- 
tor, and officer (CBCA, ss. 24, 102, 121). Corporate law thus establishes one type 
of legal distinction between the identity of 'owner ' and that of 'worker' in a 
business enterprise. Shareholders make the investment of capital that , pooled 
together, allows the enterprise to function (Ireland et al, 1987). Should the 
enterprise make a profit, shareholders will likely see the market value of their 
shares increase and  possibly get paid dividends on those shares. Many corpo- 
rations contain a number of 'classes' of share ownership, each of which 
bestows a set of corporate 'rights' on the holder. The most significant distinction 
among classes of shareholders has to do with whether the shares are assigned 
voting rights at shareholder meetings. Holders of voting shares are considered 
to 'control' the corporation in the sense that they are the shareholders who elect 
the board of directors and also make a number of significant corporate decisions 
requiring their approval (CBCA, ss. 24, 173, 183). As shareholders, they have no 
particular obligations to the firm and, indeed, remedies are available to them if 
actions taken by the company or its directors are not in their best interests. 
Discussion of some of these remedies, including the inaptly named 'oppression' 
remedy, will form a significant part of the second half of this chapter. 
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On the other hand, directors are elected by shareholders to run the company 
on their behalf. Their legal responsibilities are not particularly clearly specified 
in the corporate statutes, beyond an admonition to take some care in running 
the corporation and to act in its 'best interests', a formulation known in corpo- 
rate law as the fiduciary duty, or the duty to be loyal (CBCA s.122). Mu ch 
debate has surrounded the question of whether these statutory responsibilities 
mean that they have to act in the best interests of the shareholder-owners only, 
or that they can take into account the interests of constituencies other than 
shareholders, such as workers, consumers,  the  environment,  and so on .3 
Of ficers are full-time employees who are appointed by the board of directors to 
run the company, ostensibly \Vith oversight by directors. The reality in small 
corporations such as family businesses, however, is that all these legal roles 
actually may be filled by the same people, a fact that makes the accountability 
devices of voting and requiring loyalty, established by the corporate legal rules, 
somewhat redundant. 
From an economic point of vie\v the establishment of legally distinct roles 
within the corporate structure is justi fied by the virtues of specialization and 
comparative advantage. As Easterbrook and Fischel (1991: 11) put it: 
 
The separation of risk-bearing [via investment] from employment is a form of 
the division of labor. Those who have wealth can employ it productively even 
if they are not goodmanagers; those who can manage but lack wealth can hire 
capital in the market; and the ex.istence of claims that can be traded separately 
from employment allO\VS investors to diversify their investment Interests. . . . 
Investors bear most of the risk of business failure, in exchange for which they 
are promised most of the rewards of success. 
 
Further, as Cheffins (1997: 34) points out, 'The hierarchical organization of a 
firm offers another important advantage which is that joint production can be 
organized on a more effective basis.' 
A feminist perspective would counter, at the most obvious level, with the 
empirical observation that despite the fact that these legally established 
categories are formally gender- neutral, comparatively few women perform 
these roles. One of the difficulties with drawing conclusions here is that the 
actual extent of women's shareholding in corpora tions whose shares do not 
trade on public 1narkets (i.e., most family-run corporations) is hard to conclu- 
sively establish. But case law dealing with family businesses tends to reveal 
anecdotally that if women are shareholders, the classification of shares they 
hold are the non-voting shares. In other words, while they may be owners, they 
do not necessarily share control ( The Queen v. Mcclurg 1990; Re Ferguson, 
1983). This makes Davidoff and Hall's (1987: 277) historical point tha t 'It was 
primarily women who were the beneficiaries of "passive· property yielding 
income only: trusts, annuities, subscriptions and insurance' of continued 
contemporary relevance. On the other hand, with respct to the larger, publicly 
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traded corporations, one of the recurring liberal feminist cnuc1sms of the 
corporate sector in Canada has been the paucity of women directors. At the 
moment 9 per cent of public Canadian corporations have women directors 
(Carlyle, 1995). 
At another level, feminists would be attent.ive to the fact that these legally 
established categories of shareholder, director, and manager have the effect of 
assign.ing power, control, and inequality in specific ways. Hierarchical organi- 
zations, both commercial and non-commercial, have long been subjected to a 
feminist critique for their tendency, not only to exclude women in the interests 
of particular versions of 'social cohesion', but to express masculine values 
(Ferguson, 1984; Elson, 1994: 39-40; Gabaldon, 1992: 1429). Even more signif- 
icantly, it is necessary to be attentive to what happens once women come to 
play these  roles in particular  corporate hierarchies. Although the empirical 
evidence we will later consider deals only with one corporate sector, the family 
business, one of the important research findings in this respect is that women 
owners or decision-makers in these enterprises do not necessarily exercise the 
power or control the legally defined categories of shareholder or director 
accord them. Understanding why this is so is crucial to our ability to draw 
conclusions about the role of corporate law in reproducing gendered social and 
material relations in the context of the family business . 
Limited  Liability 
It has been noted that the allocation of specific legal risks and liabilities is 
closely connected to the creation of specific corporate roles. The establishment 
of limited liability for corporate shareholders (CBCA, s. 45) is of ten seen as the 
fundamenta l feature of corporate Jaw. This principle m eans that, generally 
speaking. shareholders are not personally liable for any debts incurred by the 
corporation that it is unable to pay. All that a shareholder stands to lose in 
making a corporate investment is the value of the investment that she or he 
has contributed. This occurs despite the fact that the shareholder, depending 
on the number of shares held or other roles performed, may be in a position to 
cause the corporation to incur the debt in the first place. Nor, as a matter of 
corporate law, are directors usually personally liable for the debts of a corpo- 
ration, either, although a number of recent statutes will assign specific respon- 
sibilities to directors, such as in the environmental law area. But directors can 
be sued by the corporation, or its sh areholders, for f ailure to abide by their 
duty of loyalty to the corporat ion. 
Law and economics scholars have an elaborate set of justif ications for the 
doctrine of limited liability (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991; Chef tins, 1997; 
Gabaldon, 1992). Among the most popular arguments from this perspective are 
that the rule allows investors to diversify their risk and so promotes further 
investment, since they know in advance ho\v much risk they bear in investing 
in a corporation (that is, they know the maximum they can lose). The rule also 
allows the stock market to value shares appropriately, since it does not have to 
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take into account. in assigning values to shares, the wealth of , and likelihood 
of recovery from, individual shareholders. This enables the stock market to 
work efficiently. Furthermore, limited liability reduces the need to mon itor or 
oversee the decision-makers in the f irm (assuming t he owners are not 
themselves the decision-makers), because t he shareh older's exposure to risk is 
not unlimited . The apparent problem \11Jith moni toring is that, first, ii is costly, 
especially in large corporations \Vith many shareholders, and, second, share- 
holders with only an insignificant holding have no incentive to engage in 
monitoring that would benefit shareholders generally (the 'free rider ' 
problem). In this sense, allocations constit ut ed by the limited liability doctrine 
privilege the interests of shareholders over those creditors who lend the 
con1pany 1noney, or who supply it with goods, but do not thereby obtain an 
ownership interest. In response, law and economists argue t hat limited liabil- 
lty actually equalizes the position of shareholders and creditors since both 
groups stand to lose only what they invest. Shareholders, of course, stand to 
gain more than creditors should the corporation turn a profit. 
As  we  can  see,  these  justifications  revolve  around  ideas  of  promoting 
efficiency generally, and more specifically, of sh ifting risk to where it is most 
efficiently borne. Theresa Gabaldon has engaged in an extended critique of the 
law and economics just i fications for limited liability f rom a feminist perspec- 
tive. She points out that while t h e economic  analysis of limited liability 
'permits particular actors . . . to calibrate the economic gan1bles that they are 
\"lilling to take' on the basis of a profit/loss calculation, it does not 'address the 
responsibility-culpability characterization'. She argues that 'liability limitations 
artificially distance individuals fro1n the real-life effects o{ the enterprise in 
which they invest, thus decreasing their ackno\v)edged personal responsibility.' 
She further asserts that the 'key difference between economic and feminist 
reasoning on this point is . . . the feminist belief that int erest in monitoring is 
a social good, rather than a duplicative waste' (Gabaldon, 1992: 1424). This 
argument presumably cannot be taken to the somewhat essentialist length of 
saying that i{ women ran corporations, they would be more likely to accept 
personal responsibility for their act ions. It is rather to acknowledge that the 
legal rule on limited liability constitutes understandings of the appropriateness 
of risk displacement and the need for accountabi lity for corporate 'harms' in 
particular ways, which may, at least in part, be related to the interests of those 
with superior econo1nic power within the corporate enterprise. For a pa rticular 
strand of feminist analysis, participation and accountability are va lu ed in and 
of themselves, irrespective of \vhether they contribute t o the efficient operat ion 
of a corporate enterprise. 
Finall y, it should be pointed out that law and econornists are generally more 
sanguine than are feminists about the possibility of  unlimited liability for 
shareholders in the case of small corporations. This is because in those 
contexts, the connection between the capacity of the shareholder to control the 
corporation and i ts ultin1.ate actions is a closer one. This posi tion, of course, is 
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based on an assumption about shareholder control that would  benefit  from 
being supported by empirical investigation, particularly where women  fill 
those shareholding roles in family businesses. 
 
Profit Maximization 
While profit maximization is not unique to the corporate for1n of business 
enterprise, there are various ways in which the norms of corporate law lend 
particular support to this goal. For example, the judicial interpretation of the 
fiduciary duty of directors to act in the best interests of the corporation has 
emphasized the interests of shareholders in  corporate profit maximization at 
the expense of attempts by corporations to engage in 'socially responsible' 
behaviour (Dodge, 1919; Parke, 1962; Varity ; Teck , 1972; Tolmie, 1992).This is 
why corporations that attempt to be socially responsible usually use as a justi- 
fication the fact that such behaviour is in the shareholders' interests. Another 
example of corporate law support for the goal of profit-making is the rule with 
respect to shareholder proposals, which is that shareholders can only request 
the corporation to act, or refrain from acting, in order to achieve the economic 
interests of the corporation as opposed to other, more 'social' interests (CBCA, 
s. 137). 
The singularity of this goal of  corporate enterprise is justified by economic 
theory at a number of levels. At one level, the rational actor who is the core of 
economic theorizing is assumed always to act in his or her self-interest so as 
to maximize his or her 'utility'. An econon1ic system, and the legal rules that 
support that system, must seek to allow individuals to pursue their particular 
self-interest in the course of their interactions with others, since to do other- 
wise would be to impose a particular set of preferences on them. As England 
(1993: 45) points out, although self-interest need not in1ply selfishness, or 
specifically in the context of corporations, profit maximization, 'in practice, 
most economists do assume selfishness in markets."l England sees chis as 
flowing from the 'separative model of self', which is at the core of economic 
reasoning. With respect t o the fiduciary duty of directors in the corporate law 
context, however, loyalty (often considered antithetical to selfishness) to the 
corporation is expected, but this loyalty is requjred to be exercised in the inter- 
ests of profit-making for shareholders . At another level, economists argue 
simply that a singular goal is more efficiently accomplished than a multifaceted 
one. Furthermore, it is argued  to be undemocratic to require or expect 
unelected directors of corporations to achieve socially responsible or distribu- 
tive outcomes by their decision-making. 
In assessing whether this focus on self-interest and profit maximization is a 
gendered one, scholars such as Folbre and Hartma nn (1988: 193, 195, 197) 
caution against a potential feminist response that women 'are not as econom- 
ically rational or self-interested as men'. They characterize the argument that 
'women altruistically choose' to put the interests and well-being of others, such 
as famil y members, ahead of their own economic interests as 'ideological'.5 
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They argue that a more fruitf ul approach would be to bring 'the traditional 
boundaries between self-interest and altruis1n into question' and to 'develop a 
more complete theory of economic interests, one that can encompass concepts 
like cooperation, loyalty, and reciprocity'. A family business is, of course, an 
important place to see a multilayered economic rationality at work. Anderson's 
work (1993: 34-5) contains an example that nicely illustrates, in a business 
context, this effort to develop an expanded understanding of economic ratio- 
nality. She describes the couple who 'struggle for years to . . . establish a 
family restaurant' and who are offered a buy-out from a franchise operation. 
She argues that 'A concern for the narrative unity of their lives, for what 
meaning their present choices make of their past actions, could rationally 
motivate them to turn down the offer.'6 In other words, despite presumed finan- 
cial benefits to be gained from selling out, an expanded definition of economic 
rationality would instead result in a continued commitment to, and satisfaction 
with, an enterprise to which they had devoted a significant part of their lives. 
Fehlberg's study of women involved in family businesses, discussed in more 
detail below, found that 'involvement in the family business reflected "the 
often passionate belief that marriage and business were intimately inter- 
twined'" (1997:  14). 
To summarize, then, an attempt has been made to articulate the ways in 
which corporate Jaw may operate at a symbolic level to 'engender' the corpo- 
rate form, by privileging valu es of efficiency over accountability, hierarchy over 
inclusiveness, risk displacement over responsibility, and profit-making over 
social responsibility. But it is important to investigate empirically the extent to 
which, and how, this discursive framework of corporate law actually structures 
practices within the family firm. It is a truism of socio-legal scholarship that 
the 'fit' between the 'law in the books' and the 'law in action' is not usually a 
complete or smooth one. It is to this issue that we now turn. 
 
Women, Corporate Law, and Family Businesses: 
Some Empirical Evidence 
I have noted that the family business provides one empirical entry point into 
the question of the opportunities for, and characteristics of, women's involve· 
ment in business enterprises as owners or directors. Research into how the 
participation of women in this realm is structured is relatively new, but still a 
few trend s may be observed. Again, there has been little empirical considera - 
tion to date, especially in Canada, of how the role of women in family 
businesses has been mediated by law, though a number of Australian feminists 
recently have embarked on such a project. The goal is to use this empirical 
evidence to assess the power of corporate law in 'gendering' the participation 
of women in these enterprises. 
The first two of the followi ng empirical studies described did not. in fact, 
have the role of law as a primary focus. ln an English study titled 'Entrepre- 
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neurship,  Ethnicity, and Gender',  Phizacklea  (1988)  examines the  contempo- 
rary relationship among class, gender, and race  in the context of the family 
firm. In answer to the question, 'Do members of a family firm share an identi- 
cal class situation or not ?' she responds in the negative. Her study of the opera- 
tion of the clothing industry in  the  West Midlands  demonstrated that 'All 
female members  and young  male members of the family are working under 
patriarchal  relations of  production, they  remain  dependent for  their  mainte- 
nance on the 'boss'  who is usually  also the head of the household, in return 
for their efforts'  (Phizacklea,  1988: 31). She concludes that  while it  has been 
well documented that 'access to "iamily" or community 1nembers as low-wage 
workers  is a key competitive advantage for many  ethnic businessmen'. what 
has been less evident is 'the extent  to which this "family" and  "community " 
labour  is female and subord inated to very similar pa triarchal cqntrol mecha· 
nisms in the workplace as in the home.'7 
In a 1991 groundbreaking study conducted for the Canadian Advisory 
Council on the Status of Women, Belcourt et al . investigated the 'struggles, 
challenges and achievements' of more than 200 women business owners across 
Canada. One of the main purposes of the study was to 'consider how public 
policy might facilitate the work of female entrepreneurs and thus help to 
harness the economic benefits of this form of business development' (Belcourt 
et al., 1991: 1). In a telling example of the absence of corporate law as a 
variable studied, it is not completely clear that the businesses surveyed were 
in fact incorporated, although the study contains a table (ibid ., 11) entitled 
'company start up', indicating that 60 per cent of the women surveyed founded 
their businesses themselves, 29 per cent bought them, and 5 per cent inherited 
them.8 The overall conclusion of the study was tha.t in addition to the usual 
difficulties facing all entrepreneurs in making a success of a new business 
venture, 'a woman entrepreneur faces conditions that appear to be attributable 
almost completely to the fact that she is a woman in a non-traditional occupa- 
tion. . . . Surrounded by opportunities but hemmed in by circumstances,  the 
won1an entrepreneur sees her ability to realize business and personal success 
limited by a number of obstacles' (ibid., 65). 
In proceeding to identif y those obstacles, the study enumerates issues such 
as: discrimina tion,9 clustering in business sectors with low financial pay-off, 
limited relevant work experience or 1nanagement training, shortage of peer 
support networks or an inability to make use of them because of being 
'overloaded with business and family responsibilities' (ibid., 67) and insuf fi- 
cient financial return. Included in the list of obstacles were those of the 
'conflicting demands of managing a business, a home and children' and 'no 
operational support from husbands'. With respect to the former,  the  study 
notes that 'the double shift is standard'. with most of the women entrepreneurs 
they studied, unlike men entrepreneurs, assuming 'complete responsibility for 
home and children'. With respect to the latter, few of the study's respondents 
'were able to rely on their husbands for  anything but token help'. The help 
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given by husbands was characterized as 'one-shot ', but 'nothing close to the 
continuing responsibility taken on by many wives of male small business 
owners'. Significantly, Belcourt et al. conclude that 'although some have 
broken new ground in the business world, thus far they have not renegotiated 
the traditional division of family and household tasks' (ibid., 69-70). Thus, 
while this study did not set out to examine the effects of corporate law rules 
on women's experience of entrepreneurship, what is striking about its conclu- 
sions, as well as those of the Phizacklea study, is that the most influential 
practices in the gendering of entrepreneurship have to do with the intractabil- 
ity of the traditional familial roles played by women rather than being attrib- 
utable to what business law rules 'allowed' or required women to do. This 
suggests that corporate law's gendering role may be less signif icant than that 
of traditional family organization or familial divisions of labour. 
Australia has been a more fertile location for feminist legal consideration of 
the role of women in family businesses. For example, Dodds Streeton (1994) 
examines the liability of women as company directors or guarantors for the 
debts of their spouses or the companies of which they are directors, in a 
process now widely characterized as 'sexually transmitted debt' (Fehlberg, 
1994: 475). She argues that women directors became liable for company debts 
because they 'share the hallmarks' of a surety, who guarantees the debt. Yet, 
'Although formally appointed as directors, these won1en will often have little 
opportunity for actual involvement or input into the business because of their 
'traditional' role in the patriarchical family and their exclusion from matters of 
business' (Hall, 1995: 175). Dodds Streeton (1994: 16) ultimately concludes : 
 
The fundamental problem of women's vulnerable position in personal and 
family relationships with men, and their relative exclusion from commercial 
experience and control cannot be solved by law. . . . If the law attempted to 
address the problem of the pervasive vu lnerability of women as a group by 
absolutely precludi ng creditors from access to their assets, it would effectively 
destroy their legal capacity, restrict their access to credit, and totally undercut 
the achievemen t of equal and independent status. 
 
In similar vein, Fehlberg describes t\vo studies of women's involvement in 
family businesses, one conducted in Australia by Singh (1995) and the other 
conducted by Fehlberg herself in England (1997). These studies found that 
although the women surveyed tended to be very 'involved' in the family 
business on a day-to-day basis, they were 'likely to vie\v themselves as less 
powerful than their husband or de facto partner in the family business context' 
(Fehlberg, 1997: 2). Interestingly, one of the findings of the Fehlberg study was 
that women who described themselves as having no role in the family business 
often held the legal positions of corupany director, company secretary (officer), 
or shareholder. Yet, 'they had never considered exerting their formal legal 
rights as directors or shareholders in order to obtain a direct financial benef it 
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from the business. Similarly, women who held shares invariably did not know 
the extent of their shareholding' (ibid., 8). The Singh study contained one 
example of 'Mrs. A not being "allowed" to see the books, even though she was 
the company secretary, [which] indicates strongly the discrepancy between 
formal legal rights and practical realities.' Fehlberg concludes that 'these 
findings challenge the accuracy of contractual assu1nptions that legal rights are 
readily acted upon and transla ted into practical benefits.' Furthermore, even 
women who were involved in the 'financial operation· of the business had 'no 
role in strategic decision-making' . a position Fehlberg characterizes as 
'informed powerlessness'. Thus, 'the business emerges in these studies as 
ultimately the province of the male decision-making authority. Women may be 
very involved in family businesses without sharing the strategic decision- 
making power' (ibid., 15). 
To what extent does this empirical material shed light on the feminist 
critiques of corporate law doctrines described above? In the first place, it 
suggests that the analysis of the doctrine of limited liability of shareholders as 
being responsible for the passivity and non·inv olvement of shareholders in the 
direction of corporate activity is incomplete. Rather, the picture that emerges 
here is that women as owners or directors of family businesses continue to be 
enmeshed in power inequalities that derive from the practices of traditional 
family relations. As Grbich (1987: 329) puts it in the context of taxation laws. 
'Positions for women appear never to be secured by rights to income or to 
property so Jong as her position is part of familial relations.' Furtherm ore, we 
have seen that one of Singh's findings was an 'often passionate belief that 
marriage and business were ultim ately intertwined' (Fehlberg. 1997: 14) , 
suggesting again that the formal legal charact erization of a con1pany as a 
separated and independent actor has no particular resonance in the context of 
family businesses. 
 
From Oppression to Corporate Power? 
The material discussed in the preceding section arguably suggests some limita- 
tions on our ability to impute a significant power to corporate law to accom- 
plish unaided the 'gendering' of family businesses. Another striking feature of 
the picture painted by this empirical material is that, while the extent of corpo- 
rate law 's contribution is arguably unclear, women appear vulnerable in the 
family business or entrepreneurial context, victims of their lack of commercial 
experience or their position in the family. But a rather contradictory impression 
emerges if we consider some exan1ples of the use by women shareholders of 
the shareholder remedies provided for in various provincial corporate statutes 
and the Canada Business Corporat ions Act. The most controversial remedy is 
that known as the oppression remedy, which allo\vs shareholders and other 
'complainants' to seek a judicial remedy if their interests have been 'oppressed' 
or uniairly prejudiced by actions taken  by  the corporation or its directors. 
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Another is tbe winding-up remedy \Vhich allows a court to order a company to 
be wound up or liquidated, and its assets dispersed to shareholders, if a share- 
holder has legal grounds for such a request. An interesting feature of the cases 
considered below is precisely the use of these remedies in the context of family 
dissolution, a situation where women's econon1ic interests are considered by 
family lawyers to be particularly vulnerable. 
One of the best -known Canadian shareholder oppression cases is Ferguson v. 
Jmax.10 Here the mobil iza tion of the corporate law remedy had the effect of 
allowing the  complainant  shareholder to achieve recognitio n  for  her  contribu· 
tion to the business enterprise and to remain a shareholder despite significan t 
opposition f rom another po\verf ul sh areholder, her  ex-husba nd. The  case 
involved  a business (Imax) owned by three heterosexual couples,  the 
Fergusons and  two others, both  of  ivhich couples were previous associa tes or 
friends of Mr Ferguson . All three women involved held non-voting preference 
shares, whereas the men  held voting  shares  (meaning, as we have  seen, that 
they had  control of the  decision-n1aking). Only Ms Ferguson, of  the lhree 
women, activ ely  participated  in  the company. The Ontario  Court  of  Appeal 
found  that  'she worked  hard  in  the compa ny's interest and  was  ooe of  its 
founders together with the three men.' In fact, the three men 'were each 
employed in other endeavours and could not devote their full t ime to the 
co1npany.' In 1974, Ms Ferguson divorced her husband on the grounds of his 
infidelity. The issu e vve are interested in revolved around her conten tion, which 
was accepted by the cou rt, that from the time of the divorce Mr Ferguson did 
his uunost to squeeze her out of her shareholding in the company. He first tried 
to prevent t he declaration of dividends to the class of shares that she owned 
and ultimately used corpor ate proced ural devices to attempt to pass a resolu· 
lion that would have had t he effect of forcing redemption (repu rchase) by the 
compa ny of her class of shares. thereby elimi nating her invol.vem ent as a 
shareholder. Ms Ferguson was pressured by other shareholders to  sell  her 
shares because, according to them, her former husband wou ld n ot  counte- 
nance the declara tion  of dividends while she would share equ ally in them. 
Th e court held that the conduct of lvtr Ferguson on behalf of the compa ny 
was oppressive. Thus (p. 135) , 'I am satisfied that what she says is true. The 
company could pay dividends. Mr. Ferguson set out to stop the payment 
because he did not \Vant Mrs. Ferguson to share in the benefit s in t he grov.rtb 
of the company and wanted to force her to sell her shares to him or to one of 
the other n1en in the company. . . . In my opinion this condu ct was oppressive 
and unfai r to her.' Significantly, the court concluded that when dealing with a 
'close' corporation (a sn1all company with few shareholders) , the court 'may 
consider the relationship between ihe shareholders and not simply legal rights 
as such' (emphasis added). Even though evidence was provided that there 
were economic advantages to the corporation of doing the reorganization of 
the share classes, the conduct was oppressive because the 'reasons that 
motivated management' were unfair. In rather disturbing l anguage, the Court 
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of Appeal characterized the attempt to pass the corporate resolution to redeem 
Ms Ferguson's shares as ·a final solution to the problem of the ex-wife share- 
holder'. On the basis of the evidence, the court was unwilling to accept that the 
company had a valid business purpose in attempting to squeeze her out. She 
was thus able to mobilize to her advantage norms of corporate law requiring 
directors to have valid business reasons for their actions on behalf of corpora- 
tions. In view of our earlier discussion about the need articulated by feminists 
for a broader conception of economic interests, it is also significant that Ms 
Ferguson's interest in this company, as recognized by the court, was one that 
came out of her loyalty to and history of participation in it. The result 
ultimately allowed her a continued interest in the company's affairs and 
prosperity rather tl1an resorlirlg to the family law approach of dividing of 
property and severing t ies. 
Another example of the strategic use of corporate law by women sharehold- 
ers comes from the more recent M. v. H.11 case. Here a lesbian couple were 
separating. One of the couple applied for interim support from the other under 
the Family Law Act, which was denied on the ground that she did not come 
wi th.i n the definition of 'spouse' in the Family Law Act. She also claimed 
interim relief from oppression under s. 248 of the Ontario Business 
Corporations Act. She made this claim because of the alleged oppressive 
actions of her former partner with respect to the company of which they were 
both SO per cent shareholders. The latter began operating the company as 
though  she  were  the  sole owner. The  plaintiff  was  refused  access  to  the 
company's books and her signature was imitated (with her knowledge) on 
cheques that required joint signatures. Epstein J. concluded (p. 100) that 'lhe 
evidence here strongly supports a conclusion tha t the defendant, particularly 
in excluding the plaintif f from any meaningful pa rticipation in [the company] 
during the past S years and then closing the business down after the parties 
separated, was in violation of the plainti ff's expectations that could be said to 
have been (or ought to be considered as) part of their compact as shareholders' 
(emphasis added). The court therefore used the plaintiff's expectations as a 
shareholder to establish a standard of corporate conduct to which the defen- 
dant was expected to adhere. Significantly, the court ordered money to be 
released from a corporate account to the plaintiff by way of a loan, to be non- 
interest-bearing, and to be available to the plaintiff until the ultimate resolu- 
tion of this action. Thus the judge award ed her support under corporate law 
rat her than fan1ily Ja w principles. The norms governing relations among share- 
holders in a small business were ultimately more effective for the lesbian plain- 
tiff, in the context of relationship dissolut ion, than those acceptable within a 
family law context. 
Finally, Belman v. Belman12  is particularly  interesting  for  the  insight  i t 
affords into the dif fering legal implications of behaviour depending on whether 
the context is marital or corporate. The case dealt with a claim for division of 
assets  following  divorce.  The  judg e's  treatment  of  this  claim  explicitly 
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separated the 'family l aw' issue from the 'corporate law' issue. The first of 
these involved a claim by the former •vife for a payn1ent of $250,000 over and 
above the equal division of the spouses' property on the basis of her 'extraor- 
dinary contribution to the marriage' (p. 64). The husband had agreed to this 
in 1990 'after much discussion', bu t withd rew his agreement on hearing about 
an alleged affair between his wife and one of her business associates. This was 
consistently denied by the wife, though the court found that the husband had 
a 'sincere belief that it \Vas tru e'. Because the wife's claim to the $250,000 was 
based by her on 'a moral obligation that arose out of her extraordinary contri- 
butions to their marriage', the court concluded that the 'alleged af fair was 
relevant to that rationale' (p. 68). Further, Spence J. considered that he 'would 
have difficul ty concluding that Mr. Belman 's reaction was unreasonable'. Mr 
Belman was therefore released from the obligation lo pay the money to his 
former wife. 
However, what was considered a reasonable reaction in the context of 
marit al obligations was regarded otherwise in the corporate context. The 
corporate law issue arose from a claim by Ms Belm an for a transfer to her of 
her former husband 's SO per cent ownership in the corporation. This claim was 
made on the grounds that there was a 'loss of mutua l confidence' bet\veen the 
two owners such that t he business could no longer be conducted effectively. In 
response to this, the husba nd claimed that he had not lost confidence in his 
former wife (having forgiven her for her alleged conduct), so that the grounds 
for a mandatory transfer of his shares were not present. In his consideration of 
this issue, the judge again relied on the response of the husband to the infor- 
mation he received  about  his  wife's alleged  affair. Mr  Belman's denunciation 
of his wife follo\ving his accusation about the affair, and his statement that 'he 
did not wish to see her again or to continue to work with her· (p. 78) meant 
that her loss of confidence in their ability to carry on together in the business 
·was entirely appropriate' and could not be said to be 'arbitra ry or unreason- 
able'. Mr Belman had requested that the court consider his wife's concerns 
about continuing to work with him as a business partner as being 'exaggerated 
or without foundation '. Significantly, Spence J. concluded that this was 'in 
effect an invitation to the court to substitute its business judgm ent for that of 
Ms. Belman and should accordingly be treated \Vith the greatest caution' (p. 
79). The result of this, therefore, was that Ms Belman's business judgment was 
deferred to by the court even though her interpretation of her 'moral obliga- 
tions' was not. The privilege that courts tend to a\vard to the business 
judgment of directors in running corporations as they see fit prevented the 
former husband in this situation from being able to characterize his wife's wish 
to dissociate him from the business as exaggerated and unreasonable. 
As we have seen, the remedy sought by Ms Belman was an order that would 
direct the transfer to her of Mr Belman 's shares for fair market value. The latter 
wanted, instead, a court-ordered shareholders' agreement relating to the direc- 
tion  and  management  of  the  business, which  wou ld  allow  him  to remai n a 
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shareholder in the business. In choosing between these two proposals, Spence 
J. favoured that of the wife, ordering a mandatory transfer of lvlr Belman's 
interest in the company to her at fair market value. The demands of running a 
business effectively, it seems, preclude any tolerance for ongoing disputes and 
loss of confidence in a partner's business acumen. 
The significance of these cases is only partly that they show, in contrast to 
the Australian material referred to earlier, how women in family-run enter- 
prises can use corporate law principles to their advantage.13 Even more impor- 
tant is a specification of the corporate law logic that proves compel ling in these 
cases.This logic has to do with a privileging of judgment s abou t how to run a 
business effectively and requirements for 'valid business purposes' in making 
decisions, as well as for demonstrations of loyalty to a company. It seems that 
as Jong as they formulate their claims in terms of these corporate logics, plain- 
tiffs in cases such as M. v. H. or Belnian may escape the potentially negative 
effects of how family law norms reinforce prevailing understandings of 'appro- 
priate' family relationships . 
 
Conclusion 
It may well be premature to draw conclusions on the basis of such preliminary 
data. But the data so far suggest that there is no easy answer to the question 
of the extent to which corporate law is complicit in. or furthers, the oppression 
of that class of women who are business owners or managers. The answer 
depends in part on a close consideration of the relationship between the role 
of corporate law as discourse and its importance in structuring actual business 
practices. While the discourses of corporate law may have general social effects 
in privileging particular sets of values, it is crucial to develop a nuanced under- 
standing of how these discourses actually operate in a variety of contexts. 
Further, it is arguable that corporate law is not solely responsible for bringing 
into being gendered subject positions within family firms. It is clear that those 
women who seek to use corporate law to their material advant age a.re required 
to formulate their claims in terms of particular argumen ts about loyalty to a 
corporation and the efficient running of business enterprises in order to be 
successful, as they sometimes are, But it is also arguable that the gendering of 
women's role in the family firm by corporate law cannot be understood in 
isolation from the fan1ily relationships and familial practices in which those 
women are implicated. If, in fact, women do not routinely exercise the 
economic power the legal categories of corporate law give them, the reason for 
this may have to do with the gendering practices of these traditional family 
relations and, particularly, the family law that supports those practices. In this 
sense the gendering effects of corporate Jaw and family law may in fact be 
contradictory or at odds with each other. This suggests that, in order to draw 
conclusions about the importance of law as a gendering strategy, it is neces- 
sary to be sensitive to the ways in which different discourses of law, such as 
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those produced by family law and corporate law, interact with each other to 
produce gendered subjects and material consequences, and to appreciate that 
different arenas of law may support a multiplicity of outcomes for women. 
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l. It should be noted that 'family business' is a term of art; there is no specific 
legal definition of this concept. 
2. In this paper, the terms 'corporation' and 'company' are used interchange- 
ably. 
3. Of course, directors are supposed to abide by all regulatory requirements 
with respect to consumer and environmental legislation. 
4. See also Cheffins·s contention (l 997: 156) that ·rh e mainsprings of capital- 
ism tend to derive from what many think of as baser human motives, such 
as self-interest and the desire for personal profit.' 
5. See the feminist literature (Waring, 1990; Boyd, 1997) on how business 
profit- making is subsidized by \von1en's unpaid labour. 
6. Interestingly, Anderson does not tell us v;hether either or both of this ficti- 
tious couple was a woman, or whether there was any dispute between 
them about what decision to make! 
7. The 1nediating effect of race on the gendered nature of participation in 
family businesses is an extremely significant issue in the Canadian context, 
raising as it does the further question of the role of law in that process. 
Unfortunately, these intersections cannot be pursued here. 
8. The complication here is that another 'ownership' table in the study 
indicates that some women owned their business in conjunction with 
'major' or 'minor' partners (partnership being a separate form of business 
enterprise) . The authors also quote a 1988 study by Lavoie that appears to 
indicate that the choice of the legal form of a business enterprise (e.g., a 
sole proprietorship or a corporation) is itself gendered. Thus, 'Lavoie noted 
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the tendency of women to operate their businesses as sole proprietors hips, 
although she observed that women in traditionally male sectors tended to 
follow the organizational structure preferred by men owners (incorpora- 
tion) ' (Belcourt et al., 1991: 12). 
9. This included differential treatment by creditors, suppliers, customers, and 
even employees. It seemed that 'being married and having children 
contributes to the perception of stability in male applicants, but these same 
factors are taken to suggest unreliability in women applicants' (Belcourt et 
al,  1991: 66). 
10. Re Ferguson and Imax Systems Corp. (1983) 43 O.R. (2d) 128 (Ont. C.A.). 
11. M. v. H. (1993) so R.F.L. (3d) 92 (Ont. Ct., Gen. Div.). 
12. Bel1nan v. Belman (1995) 26 O.R. {3d) 56 (Ont. Ct., Gen. Div.). 
13. It should be recognized that the ability to advance these corporate law 
remedies may largely be a function of the legal advice obtained by the 
plaintiffs. 
